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Résumé:  Cet article confronte les interprétations proposées pour le principe de 
précaution qui viennent de deux horizons différents : les théories économiques 
du risque qui s'inscrivent dans un cadre bayésien et les repères heuristiques de 
la doctrine validée par les institutions européennes et françaises. Les traits 
communs sont mis en évidence, mais aussi d'importantes différences quant 
aux concepts et aux contextes d'application. Malgré ces différences, l'analyse 
économique propose des éclairages utiles sur plusieurs questions 
controversées soulevées par la mise en œuvre du principe de précaution 
comme norme sociale. Cela concerne par exemple la réversibilité des mesures 
de précaution, la question de l'application directe du principe à toute personne 
ou aux seules autorités publiques et le problème de l'imputation de la charge 
de l'instruction scientifique des hypothèses de risque. 
 
Abstract:  This paper matches interpretations of the precautionary principle coming from 
two horizons: economic theory of risk framed in a Bayesian framework, and 
social heuristic concepts validated by public European and domestic 
institutions. Although they share some common features, it is shown that 
concepts and scopes differ a lot. In spite of this difference, analytical 
economics provide useful insights on key controversial questions for the 
implementation of this principle as a social norm. Examples concern the 
reversibility of precautionary measures, the issue of direct application to all 
individual agents versus reserved application to public bodies, and the burden 
of bringing appropriate scientific inputs. 
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1. Introduction 
Within about a decade, the precautionary principle has become a new international standard 
for public policies when potential collective hazards are at stake, i.e hazards the very 
existence of which has not been either formally established or refuted by sound scientific 
approaches. Such hazards are just asserted as potential, with various degree of plausibility, 
under existing scientific knowledge. Various fields are affected: environmental issues, food 
safety, public health and bio-ethics. In spite of a broad acknowledgement in Europe, there are 
still many controversies upon its meaning, scope, legal status and value for decision-making. 
Disputes have arisen in international arenas such as WTO about the extent to which the 
‘precautionary principle’ (written PP in the following) or just a ‘precautionary approach’ 
could legitimately be taken into account by governments for deciding trade-restricting 
measures. At a country-level, different stakeholders try to impose their own views regarding 
modern technological developments like GMOs by putting those views as a direct expression 
of what the PP is supposed to require. This leads to a medley of national policies, with 
different requirements and priorities. 
For some eco-activists
1, the PP comes to what has been called an ‘abstaining rule’ 
(Godard [1997b]), often defended on the basis of the work of German philosopher Hans Jonas 
[1984] on the ‘Imperative of Responsibility’ of present generations regarding the preservation 
of the ultimate possibility to maintain a truly human life on planet Earth. Under its lay 
version, this ‘abstaining rule’ would command that defenders of a potentially hazardous 
activity or technology bring the scientific proof of harmlessness before the latter can be 
authorised. Flawed by logical inconsistency – with a science permanently in progress but 
never completed, there is a logical impossibility of proving “there are and will be no harmful 
effects”- this rule also imposes a ‘zero risk’ norm for potential risks. The moral philosophy of 
Jonas explicitly targeted potentially apocalyptic global events only, but was not supposed to 
be appropriate to more ordinary human activities that have potentially serious, but non-
apocalyptic impacts on the environment or human health (Godard et al., [2002]). Due to 
scarcity of public resources and the pressure of other needs, the ‘abstaining rule’ would not 
only be very costly in welfare terms but unfeasible. Zero risk in one potential case would 
mean more risk in other cases. What would happen in practice would be an arbitrarily 
selective use of the rule, implying high direct or opportunity costs. Meanwhile huge sources 
of risks that are perfectly known (tobacco, alcohol, car crashes, …) will still be tolerated, not 
succeeding in attracting sufficient attention and resources to be reduced at a level more in line 
with welfare criteria. 
For other parties, in business or medical circles for instance, the PP tends to be 
perceived as an irrational, counter-productive norm. It is blamed for not strictly referring to 
scientific analysis and evidence, and for putting too much responsibility on the shoulders of 
some categories of agents who have to take decisions and initiatives (entrepreneurs, 
physicians, civil servants, researchers…). The PP would ultimately cause severe damage to 
industrial innovation and progress in health care. For some specialists of public health policies 
(Setbon [1999]), the PP would even have a net negative score as a standard for prevention 
policies by comparison with usual prevention policies based on sound science (risk analysis 
and statistics used in epidemiology): early but badly informed action would have to target a 
                                                 




































8O. Godard -2- 
wide scope of potential factors, imposing costs and changes of practices to many people 
without having any assurance to obtain practical benefits from it; such actions will be seen as 
hardly legitimate by all the affected agents and those responsible of its implementation; policy 
measures would be poorly implemented, contributing to confusion and distrust among lay 
people regarding the running of public institutions. Thus, for these parties, the emergence of 
the PP brings an unjustifiable end to science-based, rational public action. 
Fortunately, the PP as defined by positive law is definitely not either a general 
‘abstaining rule’ or a rule imposing a rupture with reasonable foundations of public action. It 
obliges authorities to take an early account of potential hazards, but it does not say that 
abstaining should prevail every time a hazard cannot be demonstrated not to exist. Absolute 
avoidance of risk may be an appropriate attitude in a few cases but does not stand as a general 
norm. For instance, a French environmental law adopted in 1995 (Law 95-101), echoing 
international law formulations in a balanced statement, defined the PP in the following terms: 
“the lack of certainty, under the present state of scientific and technological 
knowledge, should not lead to postpone effective and proportionate measures 
aimed at preventing threats of serious and
2 irreversible damages to the 
environment at an acceptable economic cost”. 
Two important ideas in this definition are the ‘acceptable economic cost of prevention’ and 
the ‘proportionality of prevention efforts’. This is where economic thinking and assessment 
can and should legitimately fit in the landscape. 
Risk and uncertainty are not new issues for economic thinking. Without going back as 
far as early contributions of Knight or Keynes in the twenties, theoretical insights and 
conceptual breakthroughs produced during the last three decades have been important. 
Unfortunately they have not been equally incorporated by practical policy-making in the 
fields of hazard prevention and environmental-related risk management. To some extent the 
PP is an innovation in the policy field that echoes economic concepts and insights already 
established for a long while. So trying to isolate what is really new and different with the PP 
for economists is not an easy task. For instance, links between irreversibility, risk and 
prospects of increasing information have been demonstrated by Henry [1974a and b] and 
Arrow et Fischer [1974] more than twenty-five years ago; their work led to the concept of 
(quasi) option value attached to reversible actions even for risk-neutral agents, when progress 
of information is exogenous. This breakthrough of the ‘irreversibility effect’ triggered an 
important research program having ramifications into several economic specialties. For 
instance it has been generalized and incorporated in investment theory by Dixit and Pindyck 
[1994], in such a way that most investors should now be prepared to host the basic concepts 
and issues of precautionary strategies. More recently Gollier, Jullien and Treich [2000] made 
a significant contribution by isolating in a Bayesian framework what they call a 
‘precautionary effect’ related to the concept of prudence in savings theory and distinct from 
the ‘irreversibility effect’. 
At the same time, as a new social norm, the PP cannot be reduced to an exercise in 
applied economics or a synthesis of all recent theoretical achievements in economics. It has a 
consistence of its own as a cornerstone of several policy issues. For instance, the PP is a 
                                                 





































8O. Godard -3- 
benchmark for managing provisional measures while waiting for an expected resolution of 
scientific uncertainty, but it cannot be reduced to this, as it is also used to justify long run 
action against a class of hazards. As a legal norm, the PP is linked to a moral and political 
background, but it is not a moral concept. The choice of procedures to put the principle into 
practice will have feed back effects on the content of the concept. There are questions about 
the respective role given to expert assessment and public debate to enlighten the content of 
‘proportionate and economically acceptable’ measures. An unresolved law issue is related to 
the extent to which the PP directly creates new legal obligations not only for public bodies 
and decision-makers, but also for economic agents and individuals.  
The purpose of this paper is not to consider all these questions but to gain insights by 
matching formal economic and decision theory and reasoned social heuristic concepts that are 
presently validated as a doctrine by institutional bodies in Europe. Such heuristic benchmarks 
jointly incorporate elements coming from the social and political debate and inputs from 
academic work. Two directions are explored: (1) what are the conceptual differences between 
the PP as a social norm and economic interpretations proposed for this principle? (2) Which 
proposals of heuristic rules can be supported by current economic concepts and insights in the 
debates that are raised by the implementation of the PP? Matching theory and socially built 
heuristic rules does not confuse social norms with theoretic economic concepts but intend to 
make a profitable use of relevant results in policy contexts. I chose the article of Gollier et al. 
[2000] as the main representative of the mainstream theoretical economic approach of 
precaution
3. In the following 
SPP stands for the social norm of the PP, while 
BPP stands for 
the Bayesian model of Gollier et al. 
 
2. Basic similarities and differences 
2.1. Similarities 
In the following section, I am going to insist upon differences between 
SPP and 
BPP. But, 
before all, I have to stress that the two concepts have some features in common. Some 
specific points will be noticed in the course of analysis. Meanwhile it is wise to explicit three 
basic common features: 
•  The PP applies to scientifically uncertain hazards and dangers, not just random events. 
This distinction is important: with random events, we do not know which event will 
happen at a point of the space-time framework; with uncertain hazards, we do not know 
causal mechanisms and laws of process to such an extent that we do not know if those 
hazards do exist. Improving knowledge of the randomness of a given class of events 
depends on repeated experience and observation, but improving knowledge of uncertain 
hazards mostly depends on scientific research activities combining both empirical and 
theoretical work. A distinctive and important feature for the PP is that where there is 
scientific uncertainty, there is a prospect that knowledge of potential hazards may develop 
in the future as a result of scientific research. 
                                                 
3 This does not mean that I deny the existence of a vigorous stream of economic research devoted to non-
Bayesian approaches of uncertainty. But until recently this stream did not explicitly contribute to the debate on 




































8O. Godard -4- 
•  The decision problem is generally framed as a dynamic, sequential one, which gives 
primordial importance to the issue of optimal timing of prevention (when to begin 
prevention of potential hazards? How to allocate resources for prevention at different time 
periods?) in a context that combines a prospect of scientific learning and multi-source 
threats of irreversibility (physical phenomena in the environment, damage to humans, 
economic investment with sunk costs, inertia of social rules); 
•  the endogenous nature of potential hazards of concern; according to human action in 
periods  1,  2,… the level of potential hazards for period n,  n+1,… is mitigated or 
amplified. 
 
2.2. Divergences on the content of precaution 
The 
SPP is grounded on the distinction between when the existence of a given hazard is 
ascertained, although its achievement may be random and described by objective probabilities 
(case of floods), and when it is still not well-established by science or experience, being just a 
non-rejected hypothesis or theory. Before the 
SPP became an admitted norm, prevention for 
environmental matters could only be justified if the existence of the hazard had been proved. 
Mere assumptions, or allegations by some agents (local populations, NGOs) that negative 
environmental impacts would occur as a consequence of some activity or technology could 
not trigger public preventive policies. The first consequence of the adoption of the 
SPP as a 
social, ethical, political and legal norm is to extend the circumstances under which authorities 
could or should take preventive measures, whatever their content. Most definitions of the 
SPP 
in international and domestic law express this idea that “the lack of certainty, under present 
state of knowledge, should not lead to postpone prevention measures”. With the 
SPP it is no 
longer expected from scientists and NGOs to bring the proof of the existence of damage for 
authorities to accept to deal with it. This is why the 
SPP is supposed to respond to situations of 
uncertainty and not of risks, if we take these terms in the sense defined by Knight [1921]. 
Precaution is a response to uncertain hazard the same way as science-rooted prevention is a 
response to known risks of adverse effects. 
Here, uncertainty refers to specific contexts: either an impossibility to set a rational 
distribution of probabilities exemplified by unique events, or an incomplete appraisal of 
possible states of the world. The latter includes the possibility of surprises and competing 
visions of the world that lead to mutually incompatible alternate sets of states. Thus uncertain 
hazards, i.e. hazards the existence of which has been neither demonstrated nor refuted by 
science, are clearly distinguished from randomly distributed hazards. Precaution relates to the 
former and prevention to the latter. 
The theoretical approach developed by Gollier et al. [2000] is quite different. It is 
framed within a Bayesian approach of risks, taking subjective probabilities as a substitute for 
objective ones. The ‘precautionary effect’ is related to (a) the prospect of an improvement of 
the acuteness of information, due to scientific progress, and (b) a specific constraint on the 
shape of the Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function of agents: the latter have to be 
‘prudent’ in the sense of Kimball [1990]. A prudent agent increases its immediate savings 
when risk affecting his future income increases. Here an increasing uncertainty is seen as an 
increasing dispersion of outcomes around the mean value. The statement that the prospect of 




































8O. Godard -5- 
Within this framework, 
BPP is defined as ‘more prevention in the short run’ when there is a 
prospect of better information in the future, compared with unchanged information, even if no 
irreversibility is at stake. This net ‘precautionary effect’ takes place in spite of the fact that 
delaying prevention would avoid immediate costs and allow a better-adjusted action in the 
future too. Both effects would produce an incremental wealth effect that could justify less 
prevention on the whole than when there is no prospect of improved information. But 
BPP 
stands when this wealth effect is more than counterbalanced by the negative impact of an 
increased ex ante uncertainty on utility. 
With this background, matching 
SPP with 
BPP demonstrates four important 
differences. 
(1)  
BPP does not distinguish between risk and uncertainty, but rests on Savage’s argument 
[1954] that all probabilities are subjective since they imply some confidence level on the 
information given by others (scientists, experts) or directly obtained by experience. So the 
issue of having the existence of a hazard to be scientifically proven or not proven completely 
disappears with 
BPP. The quest of scientific proofs is substituted by the beliefs of decision-
makers related to the existence and frequency of some hazards on the basis of their own prior 
subjective probability distribution. Scientific progress is relevant to the extent that it 
contributes to the regular process of revision of beliefs. Formally, ignorance, intrinsic 
scientific indeterminacy, resolvable scientific uncertainty, polarised scientific controversies 
around conflicting theories in progress, contingent and conventional aspects of any applied 
knowledge, pure randomness of events are all confused in one same structure, whatever the 
relevance of their distinction for practical problem-solving. 
The main message that emerged from the debate on the 
SPP (Kourilsky and Viney 
[2000])
4, led to a distinction between precaution and prevention: precaution concerns 
potential or hypothetical hazards (uncertainty) whereas prevention deals with known and 
recognised risks. This distinction cannot be understood within the 
BPP model. Instead 
BPP 
proposes another dichotomy: risky context with improving information, versus those with 
unchanged information. To this regard the 
BPP is seen just as a paradigm for managing how to 
wait for better information from scientific development
5. 
                                                 
4 In this official report to the French Prime Minister, the authors state: “The distinction between potential 
hazards and certified hazards is the foundation of the parallel distinction between precaution and prevention. 
Precaution relates to potential hazards and prevention to certified ones. (…). People often think that potential 
hazards have a low probability; the latter are unconsciously assimilated to certified risks the probability of 
which is all the more low since they are under control. This is twice wrong. Firstly probabilities at stake do not 
have the same nature (with precaution, we deal with the probability that a given hypothesis is right; with 
prevention, the hazard is established, and relates to the probability of an accident). Moreover and most of all , 
potential hazards, although hypothetical, may have a high probability of occurrence.” (“La distinction entre 
risque potentiel et risque avéré fonde la distinction parallèle entre précaution et prévention. La précaution est 
relative à des risques potentiels et la prévention à des risques avérés. (…) On pense souvent que les risques 
potentiels sont peu probables et on les assimile inconsciemment à des risques avérés dont la probabilité est 
d’autant plus faible qu’ils sont bien maîtrisés. Ceci est doublement inexact. D’abord les probabilités ne sont pas 
de même nature (dans le cas de la précaution, il s’agit de la probabilité que l’hypothèse soit exacte ; dans le cas 
de la prévention, la dangerosité est établie et il s’agit de la probabilité de l’accident). En outre, et surtout, les 
risques potentiels, en dépit de leur caractère hypothétique, peuvent avoir une probabilité de réalisation élevée” 
(Kourilsky and Viney [2000], p. 18).  
5 To stress the specificity of precaution according to this theory, Treich [1997] states: “While prevention aims at 
managing risks, precaution aims  at managing the wait for information”.  (“Alors que la prévention vise à gérer 




































8O. Godard -6- 
The latter learning dimension of the PP has clearly been one key component of the 
SPP 
right from the beginning, in line with views coming from the analysis of the irreversibility 
effect in a dynamic sequential setting. For instance it has arisen as a critical issue in expert 
debate about optimal timing for tackling global warming, when multiple source of inertia and 
prospects of better information are taken into account together with induced technical 
progress (Manne and Richels [1992]; Grubb et al. [1995]; Hourcade [1997]; Ha-Duong et al. 
[1997]; Ulph and Ulph [1997]; Webster [2000]). It is also at the core of admitted exceptions 
in WTO rules (specially the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, SPS) and 
the Cartegena Biosecurity Protocol related to the international circulation of GMOs 
(Montreal, January 2000). These agreements allow States to take provisional measures against 
food or GMOs imports in the name of hazards affecting food safety or the environment, even 
if they cannot immediately show full scientific evidence supporting their allegations: States 
have to prove that they are actively committed to resolving existing uncertainty in a 
reasonable time limit. For instance, article 5.7 of SPS Agreement reads:  
“In cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, a Member may 
provisionally adopt sanitary or phytosanitary measures on the basis of available 
scientific information, including that from the relevant international organisations 
as well as from sanitary and phytosanitary measures applied by other Members. 
In such circumstances, Members shall seek to obtain the additional information 
necessary for a more objective assessment of risk and review the sanitary or 
phytosanitary measure accordingly within a reasonable period of time.” 
 
Referring to learning and provisional measures in interaction with scientific 
developments is also part of the interpretation of the PP officially given by the European 
Commission [2000] and endorsed by the European Council of EU member States at the 
meeting of Nice in December 2000. This is what is explained in the principle 5: 
“Maintenance of the measures depends on the development of scientific 
knowledge, in the light of which they should be reevaluated. This means that 
scientific research shall be continued with a view to obtaining more complete 
data. 
Measures based on the precautionary principle shall be reexamined and if 
necessary modified depending on the results of the scientific research and the 
follow up of their impact”. 
 
Lastly, I will mention the 5
th and 6
th commandments of the 10 Commandments of 
Precaution stated in the report by Kourilsky et Viney [2000, p. 56]: 
“V- Decisions must, as much as possible, be revisable and adopted solutions must 
be reversible and proportional (Les décisions doivent, autant qu’il est possible, 
être révisables et les solutions adoptées réversibles et proportionnées). 
VI- Going beyond uncertainty requires an obligation of research (Sortir de 
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Whatever important the learning dimension may be for 
SPP, it would be wrong to 
think that it overwhelms the whole rationale of 
SPP, as will be shown thereafter. Some 
statements are quite excessive to this regard, as the one of von Schomberg, from the EC staff 
[1998]: “It is very important to note that precautionary regulation can never be aimed at a 
categorical ban on products or experiments.” 
 
(2) According to the Bayesian framework, the stylised problem sketched by Gollier et al. 
concerns a Robinson who has to make his own decisions regarding risky prospects, while the 
SPP is placed right at the beginning in a context of social co-ordination for tackling collective 
risks. The idea of a ‘Principle’ in the 
SPP means that it is not only an ‘approach’ or a 
‘psychological attitude’ adopted by individual agents, but a statement defining a public 
direction for collective choices and public policy. That move from an individual to a 
collective context induces going beyond the mere assumption of individual subjective 
probabilities informing individual decisions. Since a priori subjective probabilities may 
greatly differ from one agent to another, they raise the issue of social procedures to aggregate 
individual preferences regarding potential hazards, or alternatively to come to a shared view 
on the public strategies of precaution. In that, 
SPP is just a new case underlining the problem 
raised by public choices. But there is more. 
Why have standard prevention strategies given primordial importance to the issue of 
getting scientific proof of the existence of a hazard, and endowed experts with a prominent 
role for guiding policy? It should be understood in the context of the specific requirements of 
justification in collective settings (Boltanski and Thévenot [1991]). Justification implies the 
quest for common references to come to an agreement about the problem to solve by public 
action. Inasmuch as such elements could be provided by science, this was best supplied by 
objective facts, results and proofs since, according to the dominant interpretation of 
objectivity, the latter embraces ‘realities’ and ‘statements’ that could not be denied by anyone 
after an informed public discussion. The individualistic framework of the model of Gollier et 
al does not consider such requirements and achievements. 
Thus, in a symmetric way, this model cannot identify and address the new and specific 
difficulties raised by the 
SPP for policy-making, in searching for a legitimate and accepted 
basis for calibrating precaution strategies. With the 
SPP, reference to objective facts as a basis 
of decision-making is now substituted by unequally plausible and unequally consistent 
scientific assumptions under conditions of scientific and/or social controversy (Godard 
[1992], [1997a], [1999]). This change implies inter alia that it is no longer possible to assume 
a unique and common expert assessment of hazards: on the one hand, several groups of 
experts may come to different conclusions and priorities and these divergences cannot be 
explained just by the fact that good science would have suffered from the interference of junk 
science; on the other hand, within one expert group, some dissident views may legitimately 
appear and cannot be dismissed
6. Scientific controversies and dissents are frequently used and 
                                                 
6 The Resolution on the Precautionary Principle adopted by the European Council of Nice says: “that an 
assessment of risk must also report any minority opinions. It must be possible to express such opinions and bring 
them to the knowledge of the parties involved, in particular if they draw attention to scientific uncertainty” 
(l’évaluation du risque doit également faire ressortir les avis minoritaires éventuels. Ceux-ci doivent pouvoir 
s’exprimer et être portés à la connaissance des acteurs concernés, en particulier dans la mesure où ils mettent en 




































8O. Godard -8- 
amplified by social controversies about the right precautionary policy to decide on. Decision-
makers are no longer exposed to a unique objective expert vision of the problem but face 
several contrasted ones, without any possibility to choose between any of them on a scientific 
ground. So contexts of scientific uncertainty make issues of aggregation, representation and 
co-ordination much more critical than for the prevention of known risks; for the latter, those 
issues are mainly solved by obtaining objective assessments from experts. 
 
(3) Whereas the 
SPP enables public authorities to take preventive measures for hazards that 
are just potential, for the 
BPP precaution only means ‘more prevention’ in a context in which 
there should already be some, under an inert state of knowledge and beliefs. To a large extent, 
the practical breakthrough of the 
SPP just comes down to allowing prevention in public 
decision-making for cases in which such prevention was lacking but would already have been 
justified according to ordinary standards of economic thinking about risk decision. To this 
extent, the 
SPP helps put an end to an economically unjustified state of affairs in public hazard 
management. Therefore, the alleged conceptual breakthrough brought by the 
SPP is partly a 
socially effective illusion that permits to organise standard prevention properly. But there is 
more than this illusion in the 
SPP, since it also involves a new understanding of the 
relationship between knowledge and action (see thereafter). 
 
(4) Both approaches take incomplete knowledge as granted and nonetheless stress the urge of 
taking immediate preventive action. But they diverge in the way to position precaution in 
regard to incomplete and uncertain science: the 
SPP means that action may or must be taken in 
spite of existing uncertainty about the existence of a danger; Gollier et al. contend that the 
precautionary effect is characterised when more immediate prevention is decided because of 
present scientific uncertainty, since that is supposed to mean that there is some prospect of 
having better information in the future. Beyond a common acknowledgement of relevance of 
incomplete knowledge, both concepts express different attitudes nonetheless: the 
SPP does not 
necessitate a future improvement of information in order to justify a precautionary early 
action, whereas 
BPP strictly attaches the precautionary effect to such a prospect. So what 
Gollier et al. described may be part of the 
SPP rationale, but does not constitute the whole of 
it. 
Such a difference is also related to another issue: the dimension of irreversibility of 
damage once the latter is achieved. With 
BPP, two different effects combine together to justify 
more immediate prevention: the precautionary effect and the standard irreversibility effect, 
both related to the prospect of improving information. In that case, irreversibility is not 
critical for the conception of precaution delivered by the 
BPP and represents just an 
amplifying factor. Meanwhile, threat of irreversible environmental damage has triggered 
impulse in favor of the 
SPP, as is attested by the nature of issues for which it has been 
mobilized: biodiversity loss, global warming, ozone layer depletion, alteration of marine 
ecosystems such as North Sea, nuclear waste management, and general statements about 
sustainable development. Irreversibility is explicitly quoted in major law texts to qualify 
circumstances under which the 
SPP should be mobilized to justify early prevention. This focus 
on the threat of irreversible damaging evolutions can be such that precautionary strategies are 




































8O. Godard -9- 
knowledge in the future, i.e. of what constitutes the central condition of 
BPP. This is the 
reason why the provisional management of the wait may be abandoned by 
SPP and substituted 
by a commitment to long run action plans that attack all potential sources of a given potential 
hazard. There is no better illustration of the latter than the 1995 Esbjerg Ministerial 
Declaration at the end of the 4
th North Sea Conference of Ministers: 
“The Ministers agree that the objective is to ensure a sustainable, sound and 
healthy North Sea ecosystem. The guiding principle for achieving this objective is 
the Precautionary Principle. This implies the prevention of the pollution of the 
North Sea by continuously reducing discharges, emissions and losses of 
hazardous substances thereby moving towards the target of their cessation within 
one generation (25 years) with the ultimate aim of concentrations in the 
environment near background values for naturally occurring substances and 
close to zero concentrations for man-made synthetic substances.” 
Although the same declaration states that “in this work, scientific assessment of risks is 
a tool in setting priorities and developing action programmes”, it is clear that the 
SPP is in 
this text not principally conceived as a means of managing the wait. Is it really precaution or 
is it still usual prevention? I contend that we face here with one authentic mode of existence 
of precaution: (1) it addresses potential hazards without getting full knowledge about causal 
chains involved and the precise effect of identified factors; (2) differing from prevention 
strategies like those implemented on the basis of epidemiology, action is not determined by a 
statistical analysis of risk factors and the knowledge of probability distributions but by 
hypothetical reasoned imputations of potential hazards to potential sources. This second mode 
echoes the Jonas’ argument: we should do everything that is possible to avoid the possibility 
of future catastrophic development for humanity and to be successful in this endeavor we 
should tap on the resources of imagination and sensitivity to supplement
7 rational knowledge. 
Consequently, it should be recognized that the 
SPP embraces two very different modes 
of action. The first one can be said to be ‘tactic’ and is used as a means to manage prudent 
action in close interaction with the progress of a scientific knowledge initially marked by 
incompleteness and uncertainty. The second one can be called ‘strategic’ and is focused on a 
long-term strategy of reduction of all sources potentially involved in the generation of a given 
potential hazard. Because of these two different modes of existence, the 
SPP cannot be used as 
a self-satisfying, homogenous criterion for decision-making: 
SPP is definitively not a 
criterion, but a more general benchmark, a principle. Accordingly, the 
SPP obliges policy-
makers to take potential hazards into account but it does not impose any specific decision 
framework for defining priorities and assessing options. With the 
SPP, a key question is let 
open: given an empirical context, is it appropriate to adopt the tactic mode or the strategic 
one? 
 
2.2. About the links of precautionary actions with the development of science 
2.2.1. Why does more science mean more ex ante uncertainty? 
Development of science and progress of knowledge play a critical role in the 
BPP. As 
previously mentioned, expecting or not expecting improvement of information about a hazard 
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is supposed to be the starting point between standard prevention and the 
BPP. Inasmuch as 
precaution is defined as more immediate prevention with the prospect of getting an improved 
information in the future, there is at first sight some embarrassing paradox in the theory. How 
can such a prospect, translated for example by an expectation of a future smaller variance 
around mean value for the risk magnitude, be seen as increasing ex ante uncertainty and 
justify more immediate prevention than in the absence of new information, without putting 
some irreversibility effect in balance? Gollier et al. provide two slightly different arguments 
(p. 231 and p. 239) for a conclusion that is only valuable for some utility functions (belonging 
to the class of Hyperbolic Absolute Risk Aversion – HARA) and some probability 
distributions (small risks and two-point support). 
BPP is attributed to the net result of two 
opposite effects: 
(1) the prospect of better information means an aptitude to choose actions that will be more 
adapted and proportionate to the real nature of hazards, resulting in a reduced expected 
loss of income; better information induces a wealth effect; the expected level of future 
consumption being higher with this prospect, it would be optimal for the agent to allocate 
less resources to risk prevention in the first period; then, the risk exposure in the future 
would be increased relatively to the case without information gain; then prudent agents 
would reduce their immediate consumption to save more income for the future; since 
there are two opposite effects (the wealth effect produced by a more efficient response to 
risk and the precautionary effect) the general result would be ambiguous if one of them 
does not take advantage on the other; the 
BPP is validated when the precautionary effect is 
bigger than the wealth effect; 
(2) the prospect of getting an improved information means that the ex ante dispersion of 
probabilities relative to possible states of nature will increase (with very poor information, 
every occurrence tends to be seen as equally probable), since the decision-maker does not 
know  ex ante in which direction the improvement of information will go; then “risk 
exposure will be sensitive to more extreme signals”, thus increasing ex ante uncertainty. 
With the first presentation of the argument, increased ex ante uncertainty about future 
hazards proceeds from a lower level of prevention in the first period (or an increase of 
immediate risk-generating consumption), while with the second, it is an increased sensitivity 
to extreme signals that is involved. 
As a matter of fact, Treich, who co-authored the article of Gollier et al., involuntarily 
suggested another explanation in another paper [1997]. After having introduced the idea that 
the precautionary effect is related to the very nature of scientific uncertainty, as a promise of 
progress of scientific knowledge in the future, he identifies the following one: “Doubts about 
scientific discoveries to come are an additional source of uncertainty”. For the author, this 
statement meant that we do not know ex ante which discovery is going to be made (there may 
be surprises). But it also means that we may have doubt about the real progress of knowledge 
that will be obtained; we do not know if science will succeed in resolving uncertainty (there 
may be no discoveries). With scientific uncertainty, there is a prospect that scientific research 
will result in an improvement of information, but there is also an uncertainty about this 
prospect. This remark can be developed into two directions that have been important in the 
discussion about 
SPP. 
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improvement of information about a potential hazard; in the time-scale relevant for organizing 
prevention, we may face several different occurrences. Science may stay indecisive for a long 
while on the existence or non-existence of a potential hazard; or progress of scientific 
knowledge may mainly concern variables that are irrelevant for deciding a strategy of 
precaution. In those cases, scientific progress does not result in better practical information 
for policy-makers, even if, by itself, a long lasting inconclusive state of knowledge is a crucial 
element of information that there are no straightforward major links. Such information was 
not available at the beginning of the process of scientific research. Science may also discover 
unanticipated new phenomena that increase, at least for some time, the dispersion of results 
from models. More precisely, it may happen that models give a larger range of plausible 
results or that various results obtained by different teams deliver increasingly divergent 
results. Both occurrences increase ex post uncertainty. Progress of knowledge often takes the 
form of a discovery that things were ‘more complex than previously believed’. 
This kind of story happened for the chemistry of ozone production and depletion in the 
stratosphere (see figure 1) when one found out that the ozone layer answered by completely 
new interactions when exposed to high levels of pollutants, a situation that had never been 
experienced by nature in the past. Taking account of newly discovered factors or 
relationships, the dynamics of knowledge do not generally follow a pace of regular 
improvement in the precision of the information structure but alternate phases of convergence 
of results and phases of increasing divergence across models; the range of extreme values 
given as best estimates (upper and lower limits) at one time are regularly exceeded in the 
following periods (Hammit and Shlyakhter [1999].  
In other words, science is a venture the result of which cannot be predicted, even in 
terms of time delays needed to come to a satisfying picture for decision-making. So I will 
certainly support the view that on the medium term, the prospect of having scientific 
programs should be considered as a factor of increasing ex ante uncertainty. But this 
argument is different from the one of Gollier et al. for which uncertainty comes from the 
prospect of an improvement of information. 
Secondly, the issue at stake for 
SPP is not so much an intrinsic variation of uncertainty 
about a potential hazard but the impact that this variation may have on the decision problem. 
Two structural factors influence the way decision may be affected: the variation of the list of 
potential causes of a given hazard (the dynamics of the scientific competition between 
theories) and the framing that alternative theories impose on actions if the latter are intended 
to be efficient in terms of appropriate intensity and timeliness. A third one is related to the 
sensitivity of decisions to a change in information: to what extent variation of uncertainty on a 
given hazard is able to produce a bifurcation in existing prevention strategies? The latter may 
have some robustness, not being affected by a variation of information contained within some 
range. For instance the first 1990 IPCC report on climate change mentioned a 1.5 to 4.5°C 
increase of global mean temperature in 2100. The 2000 IPCC report extended the upper 
bound to 5.8°C. To what extent does it change the strategy to follow during the next two 
decades? Not much, or maybe nothing at all! Many scientific developments do not represent 
an improvement of information if they are not sufficient to change the relative order of 
different strategies. On the contrary, around a decision bifurcation, small variations in 
information may produce a shift in strategies. It is the prospect of an induced change in action 
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This is what really matters to qualify relevant uncertainty and relevant scientific progress. 
 
Figure 1: Evolution of scientific predictions of impacts of NOx and CFCs on the stratospheric 




Simulation year  
from Mégie [1997] p. 226 
Before 1986, the figure shows the variations of the best estimates of different modelling 
exercises regarding the impact of CFCs and NOx on the ozone layer according to the 
publication year of the results. After 1986, there has been a period of relative scarcity of results 
of models because a new disequilibrium chemistry of ozone production and depletion was 
discovered with entirely new values. Models had to be deeply changed.  
 
Thus, according to Hammit and Shlyakhter [1999], uncertainty about the value of a 
hazard parameter and informativeness (the extent to which current uncertainty may be 
reduced) cannot absorb the whole discussion about what an improvement of information is. 
Two other heuristic factors have to be considered: promise (the probability that improved 
information will result in a different decision and the magnitude of the resulting gain) and 
relevance (the extent to which uncertainty about the parameter contributes to uncertainty 
about which decision option is preferred). Another proposal is put forward by Chevassus-au-
Louis [2001], who suggests to build a scale of uncertainty on the basis of three variables: 
plausibility, computed as the product of the quantity of observations or studies on a given 
matter and the degree of consensus among experts; informativeness; and observability (the 
extent to which a hypothetical phenomenon can be identified by realistic observation 
procedures). The third variable – observability - is important in collective contexts by 
focusing on the possibility to introduce an empirical test of reality, echoing the search of an 
objectivity that could be shared by all parties. 
With the 
SPP, groups of experts involved in assessing decision issues should consider 
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uncertainty related to a given potential hazard. While parameter uncertainty, informativeness 
and observability can be assessed by scientists specialized in the concrete domain of concern 
(climatology, ecological sciences, medicine, etc.) in their own terms, relevance, promise and 
plausibility
8 clearly depend on the characterization of the decision problem, notably the 
identification of the possible decisions at hand and the scope and magnitude of their 
consequences. Such a task requires other kinds of experts (decision analysts, economists, law 
specialists) and needs a concrete interaction with the circles of decision-makers concerned. 
One leitmotiv of risk analysis is the separation between stages of risk assessment, risk 
management and risk communication. But, whereas an institutional distinction of roles is 
essential for the credibility and transparency of the whole process to the public, under the 
SPP 
this distinction certainly should not be interpreted as an intellectual separation: the way 
experts frame their assessment of potential hazards has to be relevant and meaningful for 
managers and the concerned parties. In this way precise interactions should be organized 
between experts and decision-makers to set the scope of expertise. Distinguishing roles and 
responsibilities is a positive feature for the credibility of the whole process, but should be 
understood as a means to formally organize relationships and exchange of information 
between scientific experts and managers. From this point of view, the 
SPP is not only relevant 
for risk management but also for risk assessment.  
 
2.2.2. Allowing some risk-generating activities as a scientific experiment to gain information 
on potential risks 
In their model of 
BPP, Gollier et al. consider the risk level to be endogenous, since the future 
level of risk depends on consumption behavior in previous periods. In fact they specifically 
deal with accumulative or stock-type classes of risks. But regarding ways and means to obtain 
improved information, they assume a Bayesian revision of beliefs based on scientific 
developments, i.e. an external source not directly linked to the level of the risk-generating 
activity or technology. This restriction is quite acceptable for analytical purpose; it is 
nonetheless a source of limitation for the generality of results in the way to understand the PP. 
With their model, reducing immediate consumption will at the same time reduce the future 
level of risk and allow, through savings, an increased consumption in the future without any 
loss in the future information about the risk. This may be a good proxy for the problem of 
global warming, but certainly not for issues like GMO releases for which the 
SPP is also 
supposed to be relevant. 
In cases such as GMOs, it is very difficult to gain improved knowledge on potential 
hazards without experimenting hazard-generating activities outside laboratories at some stage 
and at a sufficiently large scale to provide good insights on real-size dangers. This 
experimental strategy may be chosen for cost reasons (for instance, research programs on fish 
population dynamics using the statistics of caught fish as basic data will avoid the cost of 
                                                 
8 Against all expectations, dependence on decision frames also holds for plausibility: having in mind a 
qualitative or discontinuous scale, the different levels or thresholds of the scale used to assess plausibility should 
make sense for normative judgments and making decisions. Even under 
SPP, it is not conceivable to give the 
same practical influence to pure, but not-invalidated conjectures and to hypotheses that, although not definitely 
proven, are supported by elaborated theoretical models and pieces of empirical results coming from the 
laboratory or field observations. Experts do not have to decide on precaution strategies but the framing of their 
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specific programs of data collection that would have to be implemented separately) or 
because an empirical study of real world phenomena is necessary to improve the 
understanding of the nature of dangers. In those cases, it is necessary to take risks to learn 
about hazards. But in order to be able to learn from risky actions (for instance GMO 
dissemination), the latter should be organized in such a way as to produce maximum relevant 
and reliable information according to scientific criteria: risky actions have to be shaped and 
followed-up as a scientific experiment. This means that they should follow a strict protocol of 
procedures and avoid massive introduction from the very beginning. Inasmuch as benefits of 
risky actions are initially not well known either, accepting controlled commitment to risky 
actions would also improve the knowledge of benefits of the activity. The same could be said 
about the precautionary measures if their implementation is conceived as a means of learning 
more about both their efficiency and the nature and magnitude of hazards. This was what von 
Schomberg [1998] asked for: “In the context of incomplete scientific knowledge, it is even 
necessary to gain practical experience with products or experiments in order to complete 
scientific knowledge and for identifying actual risks. The accumulation of scientific insight by 
precautionary use enables the update of standards for risk assessments”. 
This approach would put into question a linear approach of precautionary strategies 
where risk assessment comes first once and for all, and decisions about authorizations and 
bans come at the end without any feed-back. Similarly turning 
SPP into an ‘abstaining rule’ 
and the search of ‘zero risk’ would entail a clear opportunity cost in terms of scientific 
knowledge of hazards and how to mitigate it or to adapt to it. Instead, more intricate 
relationships have to be settled between a broad risk assessment process and reasoned 
commitment to risky actions. Under a 
SPP regime, action embraces both preventive measures 
and commitment to risky actions. The latter are then conceived to improve knowledge of 
benefits and hazards, and are calibrated to entail only an ex ante accepted level of risk. Put in 
expressions, precaution is “Act to learn to act to learn…” at the same time as “Act then learn 
then act then learn then…” that became familiar in the global warming debate (Manne and 
Richels [1992]; Hourcade [1997]). 
If, in 
BPP, learning for the future were just a continuous function
9 of the level of 
consumption of the risk-generating product in the first period, what would be the expected 
analytical consequences? More immediate prevention would mean less knowledge in the 
future, less wealth effect and also less ex ante uncertainty, which would be in favour of more 
immediate consumption according to the model of Gollier et al.; but more immediate 
consumption will allow additional learning, and entail more ex ante uncertainty, and so on. 
Since we have two opposite movements, a new equilibrium would have to be found with 
more immediate consumption that could not be seen as less precautionary. Models with 
endogenous information would presumably catch this effect more easily (Richard and 
Trommetter [1999]; Richard and Trommetter [2000]). In the GMO debate, a sequential 
precautionary approach can initially consist of selective authorisation of field experiments –
they should be selective in number and magnitude of superficies -, after passing the 
appropriate laboratory tests, in order to allow risk managers to stop them if unexpected 
difficulties occur. A progressive extension of dissemination would be contemplated after 
some learning periods, but still placed under planning and co-ordination constraints 
                                                 
9 It is certainly not a good assumption in practice since the learning effect will require a minimal level of 
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(regarding the choice of variety and location according to proximity constraints). Conditions 
of  observability would be important to determine the conditions and the pace of 
administrative authorisations. 
 
2.2.3. What about a Bayesian framework? 
According to the Bayesian assumption, 
BPP assumes that it is always possible for any agent to 
set up a subjective distribution of probabilities about a potential hazard. This framework 
voluntarily ignores the empirical grounding of the distinction between risk and uncertainty. 
Meanwhile, it is very frequent in complex issues concerning potential hazards that groups of 
experts (committees, commissions, …) do not accept to give probability distributions about 
their existence and magnitude because of the fuzzy understanding of basic phenomena at 
stake (case of mad cow disease in Europe or IPCC reports on global climate change). When 
they accept to give upper and lower values around a central value, they accompany the 
statement with strong warnings that the central value has no reason to be more probable than 
any other, and that surprises driving hazards out of the range cannot be ruled out, i.e. the 
confidence in the range of values is not very high (cases of stratospheric ozone layer and 
global warming). Neither objective ranking nor full characterization of possible outcomes is 
at hand in those contexts for which the 
SPP has been conceived. As Von Schomberg [1998] 
put it: “The scientific uncertainties concerning the subject matter also imply the impossibility 
of a full quantitative risk assessment whenever the precautionary regulation is implemented”, 
although authorities do find intellectual comfort in asking for strategies of precaution to be 
implemented on the basis of a scientific evaluation as complete as possible. In domestic and 
international contexts, it is a usual source of conflict about the legitimacy of precautionary 
measures. But it is remarkable that the WTO’s Appellate body, in the case of growth 
hormones for beef, had to reject the panel’s initial interpretation that the risk assessment had 
to be quantitative and establish a minimum degree of risk. They had to recognise the 
legitimate use of qualitative information or singular factual events (Noiville [2000]). 
In such contexts, policy-makers need to find other landmarks than their own 
subjective perceptions. The latter may be both quite misleading and lacking of public 
credibility when they are not informed by appropriate expertise. This is the reason why 
debates about the role and organization of expertise have been so intense for the 
implementation of 
SPP (Godard [1997a], [1999], [2001a]; Kourilsky and Viney [2000]; 
Chevassus-au-Louis [2000]). When experts do not deem the recourse to probabilities credible, 
how may one give directions to the work of those experts and make use of their results? 
Kourilsky and Viney [2000] suggested organizing expertise in two circles. The first 
one should be dedicated to the scientific and technical examination of the nature of potential 
hazards with the aim of identifying the danger, its generating factors, the population exposed 
and its possible incidence. This approach is quite in line with standard risk assessment, with a 
greater focus on transparency on sources and magnitudes of uncertainty. Being factual and 
objective, and not normative, even if it is supported by assumptions and abstract arguments, 
this first type of expertise alone does not provide an appropriate basis for making decisions on 
prevention strategies. Thereby an often forgotten second circle of expertise is to be devoted to 
an economic and social appraisal of potential hazards, that will both consider the play of 
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place them in an economic and social value framework. According to these authors, this 
second circle should be opened to various stakeholders and not only to professional 
economists and social scientists, thus forming a hybrid forum. Such a general framework 
could accommodate the two different mode of existence of the 
SPP, as it is now described. 
 
Box 1: A case for an economic expertise to support public risk management: 
the BSE embargo crisis between France and UK in 1999 (Godard [2001a]) 
 
In autumn 1999 the French government decided not to follow a decision of the EU 
Commission and to maintain an embargo against UK imports of bovine meat. Due to a 
potential risk of dissemination of BSE, the French safety agency AFFSA had given a negative 
opinion. But an argument seemed to have been important for the government’s decision: 
social equity. According to the perception of the French government, UK meat would be of a 
rather low quality level and cheap; consequently, if the choice were to be let to consumers, 
even appropriately informed by labelling and traceability, poor people and people depending 
on collective catering (elder people in hospices, children…) would be the most affected by the 
BSE risk, which was considered unacceptable as socially unfair. But this perception has not 
been based on an independent and transparent economic expertise about the running of meat 
markets, since AFSSA is only in charge of a biological and health expertise. In fact due to 
stringent prevention measures finally taken by the UK government to ensure the quality of 
meat for exports, UK meat that could have gone to France was not cheap. There was no 
chance of seeing it concentrated in the plates of the low-income or dependent groups, just for 
economic reasons. A possible counter-argument is that UK exporters could choose dumping 
prices to sell their beef. Was it probable? In the context of general fear of BSE, and distrust in 
UK beef and effective traceability allowing a clear identification of geographical origin, this 
would have been a self-defeating commercial strategy. To find a market, UK beef exporters 
would have been condemned to adopt a reputation strategy incompatible with low prices. In 
any case, in order to improve the quality of information supplied to political decision-makers, 
various arguments and scenarios should have been considered and discussed by specialised 
groups of economic expertise ruled by the same principles of independence, pluralism and 
transparency that have been chosen for the biological and health expertise. And they have not. 
 
 
2.2.4. When science is distrusted as a guide for precautionary strategies 
Some groups in society, including NGOs that increasingly gain the trust of the public (Jensen 
[2000]) expect the 
SPP to protect society against failures of scientific method. As Santillo et al 
([1998], p. 939) put it, “It was recognition of the limitations of scientific knowledge that led 
originally to the formulation of an approach to environmental protection which was 
fundamentally precautionary in nature. (…) it must be recognized that risk assessment 
captures neither the spirit nor the intentions of the precautionary principle”. This is what 
leads Stirling et al. [1999] to claim after late Winston Churchill that the “science should be on 




































8O. Godard -17- 
situation of risk management: the loss of faith of part of the public in the ability of science to 
bring proofs based on precise causal relationships between natural processes or human action 
and environmental damage in due time. For people having a mid or radical distrust in science 
or institutions in charge of managing collective risks
10, which is not by itself an unreasonable 
position
11, the precautionary strategy should not be made too dependent on scientific events. 
Instead, it should consist of a plan of progressive eradication of all potential sources of 
potential damage whenever technology provides feasible alternatives to current practices. 
This approach is for instance in line with the Esbjerg declaration, that may be credited with a 
paradigmatic value of the ‘strategic’ concept of 
SPP. 
It is then expected from experts to identify possible hazard factors and prioritize action 
on them. According to the strategic concept of 
SPP, issues related to convenience, 
technological facility, social acceptability, economic costs would be of critical importance, 
more than detailed scientific assessment of hazards, flawed by all the unknown and hidden 
social values behind the apparent objectivity of expertise. It means that the type of expertise 
needed should be adapted: prominent scientists in the field of biology are less desired than 
people having a good knowledge of the concrete running of activities in the real world. The 
second circle of expertise would be the most important one. 
For instance, in the case of the mad cow disease, targeting systematically potential 
sources of hazard, under the double constraint of possible emotion of public opinion and 
professional acceptability in cattle-raising and agribusiness, seems to have been the core of 
the strategy of the French government, as illustrated by the ban in 2000 of any use of bovine 
intestine
12 in the food chain and of any meat and bone meal (MBM) to feed any species of 
animal. In that context expertise of AFSSA only partially fitted with the decisional 
requirements of this strategy. 
 
2.2.5. An iterative process between knowledge in progress and precautionary strategies 
The second direction for positioning scientific expertise under 
SPP corresponds to its ‘tactic’ 
mode, more in line with the analysis and proposals of Kourilsky and Viney. It is expected 
from expertise to provide a characterization of available scientific information on potential 
hazards in the terms I previously introduced: uncertainty range, plausibility, informativeness, 
observability, promise and relevance. All this is aimed at assessing the level of consistency of 
alternative scientific statements, and at allowing reflection on the policy influence they should 
deserve. For instance it should be discussed and decided which assumptions can be judged 
                                                 
10 For an empirical study of trust and distrust of the public in scientific information and expertise, see for 
instance Jensen [2000].  
11 Since there have been remarkable failures in the past risk management (AIDS and blood transfusion, mad cow 
disease, asbestos-induced cancers, late regulation of overfishing, long lasting industrial pollution of soils, etc.) 
although public authorities responsible at the time of taking preventive measures said situation was under 
control, it is quite reasonable for the general public not to trust new promises from the same authorities and to 
have suspicion that they could be captured by some sectoral or business interests. For the past management of 
the mad cow disease in the UK, precise failures involving public authorities have been identified for the 1985-
1996 period by the report of the Inquiry asked by the UK government to the Committee chaired by Lord Phillips 
of Worth Matravers [2000]. 
12 All parts of intestine have been banned because they may include pathological forms of prion proteins, 
although experimental tests of infectiosity have been positive only for ileum: using mice as models, injections in 
mice brains of intestine extracts of mad cows(excluding ileum already known as an infectious source) have not 
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plausible enough to deserve consideration and trigger preventive measures stronger than mere 
additional efforts in research. Accordingly, ranking the consistence of scientific warnings 
about hazards on an ordinal scale, analogous to Richter scale for earthquakes, could allow a 
correspondence with a ranking of options of action, from simple scientific watchfulness to 
strong measures forbidding products or technologies. Instead of conceiving the 
SPP as a 
binary criterion (authorization or ban), a precautionary strategy has to be organized in such a 
way to be gradually more stringent according to an increasing plausibility and consistency of 
scientific representation of potential hazards, for a same level of expected damage. Then, only 
sufficiently consistent statements could lead to the strongest preventive measures. Such a way 
to proceed would echo the idea of “proportionality” that is in the heart of the legal definitions 
of 
SPP. Precautionary measures also are regularly revised according to the improvement of 
knowledge along the lines introduced in previous sections. 
 
2.2.6. Two types of relationships for two modes of the 
SPP 
The conclusion of this section is the following: in the present state of public debate and policy 
responses to environmental and health challenges, 
SPP embraces two different rationales of 
prevention which add to standard justifications: (1) the first one manages the waiting for new 
scientific development supposed to improve the knowledge of hazards and is very sensitive to 
events affecting scientific activity; early action and revision of provisional measures on the 
basis of progress of knowledge constitute the core of this approach; (2) the other one 
expresses scepticism about the ability of science to deliver the final word about complex 
matters and expect that precautionary strategies will put a concrete end to threats of potential 
dangers by a progressive eradication of their possible sources. Both modes imply different 
things for expertise and the type of relationship between scientific knowledge and decision-
making. 
With the ‘strategic’ one, scientific developments are not overlooked but they are 
ranked in second position behind practical aspects of implementation (technological 
feasibility, cost for business firms and consumers, etc.) and do not interfere with strategic 
targets, which are chosen without expecting much of science. Society does not want to be 
exposed to a given potential hazard, even if, in doing so, it renounces to the possibility of 
knowing more in the future about the very existence and the magnitude of the hazard of 
concern. Consequently it renounces too to learn about the necessity to maintain the costly 
measures necessary to absolute prevention. 
In both cases, efforts to find a good articulation between expertise and decision-
making could be supported by the development of analytical models based on non 
probabilistic frameworks that accept more qualitative and rough framing of information, since 
in practice, none of the two modes of existence of 
SPP accept a generalized use of subjective 
probabilities by experts. 
 
3. The contribution of economic and decision theory to reasoned 
SPP 
heuristics  
Analytical models such as Gollier et al.’s 
BPP contribute first to their own scientific purpose 
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relevant in an empirical context for policy purpose without specific intermediate models and 
analysis taking over. The link should be established on the basis of an appropriate sketching 
of stylised facts that specify relevant empirical contexts. Meanwhile, analytical models 
provide key ideas and insights that may positively contribute to the shaping of 
SPP heuristics. 
Clearly, for instance, the main directions and principles claimed by the European Commission 
and the European Council for the implementation of the 
SPP echo some basic features and 
results of economic theory and risk analysis
13. It is the case for the need of a scientific 
assessment and the ideas of proportionality, coherence and reversibility of precautionary 
measures to take advantage of improving information. Similarly the requirement to compare 
what is achieved for a given hazard with what is done for other similar hazards and to take 
irreversibility into account through early prevention and actively developing knowledge are in 
line with economic thinking.  
What is challenging with Gollier et al.’s 
BPP is the link established between the 
intensity of immediate prevention and the prospect of an improving information: more 
prevention today may be justified for prudent agents not only because of the threats of 
irreversibility of damage but also because of the very prospect of future improvement of 
information. As I see it, after transposition in a decision-making framework, an effect of this 
sort could take place because a prospect of improvement of information suggests that the 
course of action should be revised, which implies more ex ante indecision about how to plan 
action through time, and the need to transfer additional resources to the future in order to 
secure the ability to face a new informational situation. But what do we know about the 
conditions of the emergence of the precautionary effect? Do they have practical meaning? 
Gollier  et al. identify theoretical conditions for this effect to take place. One important 
condition is that absolute prudence should be at least twice as high as absolute risk aversion 
(P≥ 2A). Authors and commentators agree that it is not straightforward to translate this 
condition in practical settings, since it is related to the ratio of the third derivative to the 
second derivative of the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, and these derivatives are 
not observable variables. So I do not suggest that this value should be considered in applied 
cost-benefit studies that are achieved to enlighten public investment decisions or regulatory 
risk management. It will not fulfil the requirements of a heuristic value. Meanwhile I suggest 
using Gollier et al.’s results in other directions. 
 
3.1. On different strategies to reduce indecision 
The same sort of initial features (i.e. a framework of present collective indecision resulting 
from both a high level of present uncertainty and the prospect to resolve it in the future, 
together with a presumption of a rapid irreversible evolution of physical states) have been 
documented in the case of forest-decay in Germany and Europe in the 80ties (Boehmer-
Christiansen [1990]; Hourcade et al. [1992]; Godard [1992], [1997a]). These researches have 
                                                 
13 This is acknowledged by John Graham ([2001], p. 110) from the Harvard Center of Risk Analysis : « The 
precautionary principle need not be the dangerous concept that some scientists and technologists fear. (…) 
While some authors continue to expound the notion that the precautionary principle is a viable substitute for risk 
analysis and management (Santillo et al. [2000]), or the notion that the principle means that proponents of new 
technologies ‘should be required to provide conclusive evidence of their safety’ (de Sadeleer [2000]), these 
views are not tenable in the context of the 1992 Rio definition of the principle, the February 2000 




































8O. Godard -20- 
shown how at some moment, in spite of conflicting positions about what should be done by 
the government, a coalition of actors urges public authorities to take measures without waiting 
for a scientific resolution of uncertainty. Their goal is not so much to optimally solve the 
problem (nobody knows for sure if measures will succeed because nobody can convincingly 
attribute the problem to precise and exclusive factors) but to stabilise the future context of 
action of various agents, in particular of business firms involved in industrial activities. Big 
industrial firms need a predictable environment and, generally speaking, prefer a second-best 
known and stable regulatory framework than fuzzy prospects about future rules of the games. 
“Persisting uncertainty suffered by economic actors is then expected to be reduced by setting 
social conventions and rules, even arbitrarily. (…) At this very moment, contextual 
stabilization cannot be deduced from ‘hard facts’ or scientific consensus. (…) (it) is generally 
based on the more sound elements at hand in the situation: available technologies that have 
reached an operational stage and are supported by a network of actors and corporations 
having vested interests in their development. At this very moment, the social process is 
gaining autonomy as regards the future evolution of scientific controversy” (Godard [1997a, 
p. 48]. There is a price to pay for this rather early stabilisation of public action. It includes 
several components: the immediate use of scarce financial resources; adoption of technologies 
that are not the most efficient to tackle the problem, considering the legacy of past R and D 
when the problem still had not arisen; the risk of having opted for a solution without 
significant or sufficient action on the problem of concern; the difficult reversibility of 
regulatory frameworks that are supposed to stabilise prospects for action, even if they do not 
fit with the subsequent evolution of knowledge
14. 
The price paid for a reduction of the indecision generated by both scientific 
uncertainty and the prospect of its future resolution can be seen as an empirical confirmation 
of the relevance of the result of Gollier et al. Meanwhile the price paid does not necessarily 
take the form described by them, i.e. more immediate prevention and more savings. In the 
case under consideration, it can also be an ex ante renunciation of taking full advantage of 
future improvement of information. Through an early commitment to some conventions and 
rules of the game, an indirect arbitration of scientific controversies by non-scientific means is 
achieved. Here lies the analytical bridge between the two modes of existence of 
SPP 
previously depicted. Prudent agents and societies accept to pay a cost to reduce indecision 
generated by scientific uncertainty and the uncertain prospect of its resolution. For some, it 
may be more prevention today, or savings and transfer of resources to the future to increase 
adaptability. For others it may be investment in new technologies with the same purpose. For 
a last group it is an ex ante renunciation of the benefits of an improved information in the 
future, in favor of the benefits of an immediate strategic stabilization of public action to abate 
or eradicate potential hazards. 
These findings raise questions about the best ways to reduce indecision under 
SPP, 
without losing the capability of making the best use of possibly improved information in the 
future. What may be called the corridor of precaution has to be found out in the middle of two 
threats of irreversibility: the one of physical phenomena driving to the potential hazard; the 
                                                 
14 Here lies a specific social source of irreversibility: once a regulatory regime has been set up, investment 
strategies of agents are progressively re-organized around this regime. Regulatory regimes tend to be fixed in 
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one of regulatory regimes and technological fixes that are poorly responsive to the evolution 
of scientific and technological knowledge. 
 
3.2 Precautionary measures should depend on the nature of risks 
One of the side results of Gollier et al. is that their ‘precautionary effect’ can be demonstrated 
to exist non ambiguously only under some assumptions about utility functions (concavity of 
the objective function in the distribution of probabilities) and types of risks (small risks and 
risks with two positions, low and large). This statement is useful in the debate about the 
generality to be given to the 
SPP. Within law research, some fellows are now ready to 
consider 
SPP as a general principle of law whatever the sector affected and the policy field 
(environment, public health, national military safety, …). In the same vein, the European 
Commission argued that the 
SPP has “become a full-fledged and general principle of 
international law”(EC [2000], p.  11), which is not accepted by other countries in the 
international arena, including the United States. 
Other scholars consider that the 
SPP is only valuable for some sectors and some types 
of hazards, and that particular contents that it may have in specified contexts should be 
preserved from premature and undesirable extension. It is no secret that, while most scientists 
favour the 
SPP for key environmental issues, many specialists are reluctant to see that 
principle implemented for health issues. In that sector, the fear is that it would place 
physicians and public authorities under a double bind (Bourel [1998]; David [1998]): on the 
one hand an obligation to treat the sick or to take preventive initiatives for the safeguard of 
public health (vaccination); on the other hand, an obligation of prevention of potential dangers 
resulting from the treatment or prevention policies. This conflict typically arose in the case of 
hepatitis B vaccination programmes in France. Invoking the precautionary principle, a 
governmental decision suspended systematic vaccination programmes at school
15 because of 
potential risks of a scarce nervous pathology and in spite of rather established benefits for 
public health. Clearly, 
SPP cannot be implemented the same way in the field of public health 
as for environmental policies. It is not possible to let patient untreated and ask them to wait 
for the development of science in order to begin a treatment only when physicians are sure 
that it is absolutely safe and the most appropriate. Taking some unknown potential risks 
(exposition to new viruses through blood transfusion, for instance) is a regular condition of 
most treatments. The case of vaccination also illustrates the trade-off between private and 
public responsibilities in order to interpret the requirements of 
SPP in a given context; some 
decisions should be assigned to private agents once existing information is appropriately 
disseminated, whereas other decisions should remain in the hands of public decision-makers 
(see thereafter). 
Even if the 
SPP becomes a general principle of public and civil law in some countries, 
it is quite important to specify its requirements in various policy fields and for various types 
of hazards. This is one major reason for which intermediate constructs are necessary between 
the general statement of the principle in laws and international statements, and concrete 
implementation by decentralised agents. If public authorities care to promote welfare and to 
avoid legal insecurity, it would not be wise for them to let the entire charge of elaborating 
                                                 
15 Vaccination was systematic but not compulsory. Parents previously had the right not to expose their children 
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specific contents to case law. As mentioned by French law 95-101 introducing the 
SPP in the 
domestic law system, this principle should “inspire protection policies within the limits of 
laws that precise its significance”. Economic analysis could help to classify situations 
according to the different kinds of risks and utility functions. 
 
3.3. Collective precautionary decisions and individual attitudes of prudence 
Another result of Gollier et al. is that the existence of a precautionary effect critically depends 
on the shape of individual utility functions, characterising very ‘prudent’ agents. A 
straightforward conclusion is that it may exist for some agents and not for others. For private 
risks, these differences may contribute to the diversity of economic behaviours and feed some 
markets. For collective risks at national or international level, this situation raises a specific 
problem of the institutional procedures to determine collective choices. Without entering the 
debate about aggregation of preferences within a collective utility function, I want to stress 
the opposition between two approaches. 
The first one, advocated by supporters of the thesis of a general and direct validity of 
the 
SPP for any private or public person (Boy [1999]) is that, independently from any existing 
regulatory framework, each agent is personally obliged to implement the 
SPP whenever his or 
her behaviour may generate potential hazards for other people or for the environment, now or 
in the future. Courts should watch the respect of such legal obligations and enforce them. 
Note that this issue is conceptually different from civil liability considerations. For any 
existing regime of strict liability, taking account of the 
SPP does not change anything. Such 
regimes do not refer to ‘faults’; it is sufficient for the victims to prove the causal link between 
the damage and the risk-generating activity. All this happens ex post, once the damage has 
been achieved and checked, and is not concerned by ex ante attitudes but by the result. 
The second one is that the 
SPP is, above all, a policy principle, the implementation of 
which belongs to the specific responsibility of public authorities. It generates a political 
accountability regarding both the organisation of a public order of precaution and 
appropriateness of public management decisions. Such responsibility and accountability could 
not be short-circuited by court interference without damage being done to the social balance 
that the 
SPP is supposed to set up (Godard [2001b]). Firstly governments have to take 
initiatives to supplement or elaborate a public framework of implementation of the 
SPP in 
various directions: targeted development of scientific knowledge by financing research 
programmes, organising public expertise, putting in place biological watch to look after 
unwanted ecological evolutions or epidemiological phenomena, developing public debates to 
enlighten what the socially accepted levels of potential dangers are and restore social trust in 
expertise. Secondly, governments should also take preventive measures to address given 
potential hazards on the basis of these various procedures. As it is asserted by the European 
Commission and the European Council [2000]), the final responsibility to define what are 
acceptable levels of potential risks should be considered as eminently political by nature, in 
relation with values of sovereignty and democracy. 
This last position would mean that law courts should not be made judges of the 
substantial balance of decisions taken on the basis of 
SPP, within the limits covered by the 
notion of ‘manifest error of appreciation’, a classical concept of fault for public decisions. 
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procedures put in place. In that sense courts could assess the legality of given public acts 
based on the 
SPP (Cans [1999]), without interfering with the fine-tuning of 
SPP decisions. 
How can the Gollier et al.’s result enlighten such issues? It may be seen in the 
following way. First, since different individual agents have different utility functions and 
different attitudes towards an increasing risk – not all are prudent -, spontaneous decentralised 
responses to a general obligation of 
SPP will presumably be very diverse across agents, since 
the latter will differently appreciate the requirement of proportionality of responses prescribed 
by the 
SPP. For collective risks, this uncoordinated diversity of responses is a source of 
damage to collective welfare, since some agents will rather carelessly contribute to alter the 
level of prevention or safety that other agents are trying to establish by paying a significantly 
higher price. This is typically a case of under-optimal Nash equilibrium in case of 
decentralised production of a public good. Secondly, there are good psychological and 
economic reasons to presume that the group of entrepreneurs having to take decisions 
involving the development and the dissemination of modern but controversial technologies 
such as GMOs or new drugs are in average less risk-adverse and less prudent than the 
remaining part of society: 
•  to be entrepreneurs, their psychology should be compatible with risk-taking; 
•  in contemporary industrialised societies their mean wealth level is superior to the 
wealth per capita of society, making most of them less adverse to loss of marginal 
income; 
•  competition by innovation pushes them to try to be the first to take a new market, and 
tends to erode incentives to take into account the subtleties of (quasi) option values 
and delaying investment until information about safety is asymptotic to certainty 
(Gollier and Treich [2001]). 
Meanwhile, such entrepreneurs constitute a group that takes a leading role in 
generating new potential dangers for health and the environment in modern society by 
massively developing new technologies, products and activities. With that background, letting 
top management of firms decide which level of risk is acceptable for society within 
SPP will 
for sure involve a level of risk-taking that exceeds the one deemed acceptable by consumers 
and citizens. 
For potential collective dangers touching the environment and public health, public 
authorities should have the responsibility to set the framework and establish trade-offs on 
levels of socially acceptable risk for a given class of hazard. But if their political 
accountability has to be respected, the right to take precautionary measures is linked to the 
seriousness of effort to settle a public order of precaution. Anyway, to bet on a 
decentralisation of judgements and initiatives in that matter, without appropriate and strong 




                                                 
16 As a matter of fact, the new French Charter of the environment, which has been integrated in the Constitution 
of France in March 2005, includes an article about the PP that explicitly attributes the charge of implementing 
the PP to public authorities that are asked to watch that risks evaluation is undertaken and provisional and 
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3.4. Hysteresis and asymmetry of precautionary measures before and after commitment 
to a potential hazard-generating activity 
Aside with the precautionary effect, Gollier et al. confirm previous analysis about the 
irreversibility effect: prospect of an increasing exogenous information gives a premium to 
initial choices that preserve future options, i.e. reversible options. In concrete settings, we can 
distinguish fundamental irreversibility of some physical transformations or losses, like the 
dying-out of a species, or the change of global climate, and more limited technological and 
economic irreversibility bounded to some time-horizon. In investment theory, the concept of 
sunk costs has been introduced to reflect this second type of relative irreversibility. Taking 
sunk costs into account introduces an asymmetry of judgements according to when the 
judgement is made and to the date of commitment to an investment. Bernanke [1983] and 
Dixit [1989] have developed this asymmetry around the concepts of ‘bad news’ mostly 
considered  ex ante and ‘good news’ mostly considered ex post. Here lies a source of 
hysteresis in the responses of investors to uncertain prospects. Before commitment, more 
attention is given to potential ‘bad news’, generating a tendency to delay decision to get 
improved information, while after commitment, the opposite tendency to look after ‘good 
news’ introduces delay to react to bad news by going out of business
17. 
This analysis can be related to the debate about the burden of proof within 
SPP. For 
some observers (O’Riordan and Jordan [1995], the major change introduced by the 
SPP is the 
reversal of the burden of proof: before the 
SPP, those alleging a potential damage had to prove 
the existence and the cause of the hazard before public action could impose some prevention; 
after the 
SPP, some scholars say that promoters of new technologies and products have to 
prove the latter to be harmless before being authorised to use the technologies or put the 
products on the marketplace. Other scholars have contented that this interpretation of 
SPP was 
not justifiable regarding lessons of logic and epistemology of modern science. What is really 
new with 
SPP is the way of putting a distance between the rationale of public decision-making 
and the requirement of scientific proofs, whatever proof should be obtained: the proof of the 
existence of a hazard or the proof of its non-existence (Godard [1997a and b], [1999]). So 
what is to be reversed is certainly not the burden of scientific proof of harmlessness, but the 
burden of proving that agents have done what they were obliged to, for instance making a 
series of predefined tests. Nevertheless, this conclusion, as it is, does not resolve the practical 
issue of who should bear the responsibility of bringing the scientific elements required to 
assess a potential hazard. 
Interestingly, the European Commission refused to adopt a one-sided position on this 
assignment issue and granted the necessity to define these obligations in relation to already 
existing prior approval regimes. When et where countries have settled prior authorisation to 
gain access to the market (drugs, chemical products, etc.) it is logical to consider those 
products as potentially dangerous until business brings the scientific elements showing that 
safety is secured under existing knowledge and testing procedures, and that potential hazards 
are acceptable. When and where such a procedure is not in place, or products are already on 
the marketplace as a result of previous authorisation, it may be up to users and public 
                                                 
17 This model can explain cases of prudence before investment, but it does not consider the implications of 
competition games in which  there is a strategic gain to be the first on a specific new market. In that case, firms 
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authorities to bring required scientific elements. They have to show that updated scientific 
information on potential hazards suggests that risk levels may not be acceptable and specific 
precautionary measures should be taken. But the Commission added: “Action taken under the 
head of the precautionary principle must in certain cases include a clause reversing the 
burden of proof and placing it on the producer, manufacturer or importer, but such an 
obligation cannot be systematically entertained as a general principle. This possibility should 
be examined on a case-by-case basis (…)”. How to decide on this case-by-case assignment? 
Clearly respective capacities to bring required elements are important, as is the preservation 
of transparency and confidence in expertise
18. But the burden sharing, among different agents 
(producers, consumers, public authorities), of sunk costs associated with the development of a 
given activity or technology is also an important feature. If a public procedure has already 
authorised them in the recent past, it may have created moral rights. In any case, banning a 
product after an authorisation was previously given will prejudice those agents who had 
decided to invest when they had taken the rules of the previous public regime for granted. 
Sunk costs install an asymmetry in situations before and after a collective commitment to a 
hazard-generating technology was made. 
Therefore, new products and technologies could legitimately be controlled by rules 
that are different from those applied to the technology in use and products that are already 
disseminated on the market because of the weight of sunk costs and of relative irreversibility 
of commitments that are borne in one case and not yet in the other. To this regard the 
principles of comparison and coherence (treating similar hazards the same way) can find a 
justified limit, in spite of apparent irrationality (why impose GMO tests and screening that 
traditional agricultural techniques did not and would not pass?). 
This conclusion could also cast some light on the choice of the moment public 
authorities should interfere with the development of activities or technologies potentially 
generating serious hazards to health and the environment. An early interaction could help 
avoid excessive sunk costs in the research and development of new technologies deemed 
unacceptable in a later phase of their course. Business may be inclined to share information 
about those developments in progress if the counterpart of accepting such a public 
precautionary scrutiny and follow-up would mean a lower chance of being exposed to 
stringent measures ex post, since the different sequences of development would be regularly 
scrutinised by a public authority. 
 
4. Conclusions 
The paper is based on the matching of concepts coming from two horizons: an economic 
theory approach of the precautionary principle framed in a Bayesian framework, 
BPP, and 
social heuristic concepts validated by public European institutions to interpret its 
requirements, 
SPP. This comparison is achieved by taking the model of Gollier et al. [2000] as 
                                                 
18 Within debates about the implementation of 
SPP, it is sometimes suggested to organize scientific expertise as 
an adversarial process, like in lawsuits. This should be explored, without forgetting that a generalization of 
advocacy expertise in an unbalanced setting has contributed in the past to the discredit of scientific expertise, 
accused to serve only interest of big business. Protecting the independence of expertise may necessitate the 
creation of collective funds or other interfaces able to stop suspicion of capture of expertise through the 
financing channel. Another option would be to allocate public funds to some less-affluent stakeholders whose 
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a good representative of the most recent mainstream economic concepts about PP. It has been 
shown that, although they share some features (PP aims at scientifically uncertain hazards, the 
problem is framed as a dynamic sequential one, hazards are endogenous, in the sense that 
future levels of magnitude of potential damages depend on actions in previous periods), 
BPP 
and 
SPP differ a lot: 
• 
SPP is distinguished from standard prevention by the opposition between potential 
dangers, the existence of which has not been scientifically established, and ascertained 
risks, for which objective probabilities can be defined and used for risk management. 
BPP is based on the distinction between risks with future improvement of information 
and risks without such an improvement; 
• 
BPP is defined for an individual decision-maker in a Bayesian framework, while 
SPP 
aims at public decisions regarding collective risks. As such this does not invalidate 
BPP, 
but the latter is of no use to address the specific issue of collective decision-making 
under scientific uncertainty and controversies: how to elaborate common references and 
justified assessments and measures about the content of precautionary measures and 
determine the level of acceptable and accepted risk, when the resources of objectivity 
can no longer impose a common reality to all? 
• 
BPP is defined as more prevention in the short run than otherwise, while 
SPP is defined 
as having prevention instead of no prevention at all, in spite of the lack of certainty 
about the existence of a danger; at the same time, 
SPP requires measures to be 
proportional and 
BPP shows a rather specific direction for interpreting this requirement, 
i.e. requiring stronger preventive action for more uncertain prospects, whereas the more 
general relationship accepted by the 
SPP doctrine is that the less scientifically plausible 
a potential hazard is, the less strong preventive measures should be (scientific watch and 
research instead of forbidding); 
• 
BPP is conceived as a provisional means of managing the wait of an improved 
information allowed by scientific progress, while 
SPP is focused on early prevention 
because of the threats of irreversible losses or changes; the first one does not exist 
without the prospect of an improving information, while the second is not dependent on 
such a progress, without systematically denying its usefulness. 
 
Beyond this comparison, some complements to 
BPP are suggested from 
SPP regarding 
the relationship with the concept of improving information. Several directions are suggested: 
(1) The development of scientific activities is not to be confused with systematically 
improved information: prospects of surprises or absence of discoveries, of long-lasting 
indecidability of variables that are critical for precautionary strategies, of alternative 
phases of convergence and divergence of results from models, all contribute to establish 
scientific development as a circumstance of increasing ex ante uncertainty for reasons 
different from the precautionary effect of Gollier et al. 
(2) What really matters is the contribution of scientific uncertainty to ex ante indecision and 
incapacity to plan action beyond short-term horizon. A description of scientific states of 
knowledge on potential hazards should catch parameter uncertainty,  informativeness, 
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(3) For some classes of hazards, information is not purely exogenous: it is necessary to 
commit to risky actions, in a controlled way, just to know more about the reality of 
benefits and hazards. This leads to an understanding of risky actions as scientific 
experiments conceived and used to provide informational feed back for the precautionary 
regime. 
(4) The Bayesian assumption that it is always possible for agents to have subjective 
probabilities is not confirmed by the practical running of public expertise for complex 
hazards; a full quantitative risk assessment is deemed impossible in contexts requiring for 
the 
SPP. 
(5) Finally, some experts and social groups see the 
SPP as a protection against failures and 
limitations of scientific method. This gives rise to two different modes of existence of the 
SPP: the first one manages the wait for improved information with provisional measures, 
oriented by the prospect of taking more adapted actions in due time; the second one aims 
at implementing a long term programme of reduction or eradication of all potential 
sources of potential damages, without being excessively concerned by scientific 
developments to come. 
A third contribution of the paper is to explore the contribution that may be gained 
from economic and decision theory to get insights on how to interpret and implement 
SPP. 
(1) 
BPP understands precaution as a means to respond to an increased ex ante uncertainty. It 
reveals the price that prudent agents are willing to pay to reduce uncertainty. Empirical 
studies on the forest decay in Germany and Europe have shown the existence of another 
response to the same problem: not more prevention, but prevention measures that stabilise 
new rules of the game for economic agents and indirectly impute the causes of a damage 
to some factors (SO2 emissions from power stations or from cars, in this case), on the 
basis of available technologies; this other solution comes down to an ex ante renunciation 
of taking full advantage of a future improvement of information and confirms the price 
that agents are willing to pay to reduce ex ante uncertainty and their incapacity to plan 
action. This uncertainty aversion also explains the influence of the second mode of 
existence of 
SPP, the ‘strategic’ one. 
(2) 
BPP shows that the ‘precautionary effect’ is not confirmed in any context, but depends on 
the nature of risks. This should refrain the tendency to see in the 
SPP a general principle of 
law valid for every situation marked by uncertainty. Even so, it would be quite important 
to elaborate specific clarification of 
SPP requirements in defined contexts. 
(3) 
BPP also depends on the shape of individual utility functions. The ‘precautionary effect’ 
may exist for some agents and not for others. For collective risks, it is important for the 
collective welfare that public authorities set a common framework of action without 
letting each agent interpret the 
SPP on the basis of his/her own attitude to risk (aversion 
level) and ambiguity. Meanwhile it is contended by some law scholars that the 
SPP is 
already a legal norm that directly generates obligations for each economic agent and each 
citizen independently from the existence of an explicit regulatory framework. Political 
and economic thinking tells us that this thesis should not be considered favourably. 
Tackling potential hazards with the 
SPP in a reasonable, proportional and efficient way 
should entail public authorities to define explicit regulatory means adapted to the nature 
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expertise, information of the public and public debate. What is at stake is to find the 
accepted social process in charge to define the acceptable levels of potential hazards. 
(4) One implication of irreversibility in the field of business investment is the existence of 
sunk costs. They lead to an asymmetry in the way investors grant information about future 
prospects according to their stance before commitment or after. Here lies a source of 
hysteresis in investment. This view can be related to the debate about the assignment of 
the burden of bringing required scientific information on potential hazards generated by a 
product or a technology. It is justified to refuse, as the European Commission does, a one-
sided general rule on that matter, since it should depend on how products and technology 
are positioned before or after the test of formal social acceptation: products already on the 
marketplace should not be treated the same way as new products, since the former have 
already been accepted and a lot of actors (producers, retailers, users) have committed 
themselves to their development and use; products and technologies already submitted to 
a prior approval regime should not be treated the same way (they should bear the burden) 
as those that are not (the burden could legitimately be placed on the authorities). Although 
apparently contrary to the principle of coherence in risk management, asymmetry of 
requirements can be justified by the distribution of sunk costs, benefits and risks across 
society. 
 
To sum up, this paper may be considered as a report of the relative autonomy of the 
development of economic theory on the one hand, and the shaping of reasoned social heuristic 
concepts for interpreting new social norms as the Precautionary Principle on the other hand. It 
is also a plea of the net value that both parties could extract from cross-fertilization, once the 
confusion between both developments is avoided. Social norms cannot be seen as a direct 
transcription of economic concepts, and economic concepts cannot be reduced to a direct 
extension of empirically shaped heuristics. Mutual adjustments of selected stylized facts are at 
the core of this cross-fertilization. 
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